Boeing 787 Dreamliner: Save Costs At Any Price. Between 1998 and 2001, the company over $10 billion invested in the repurchasing of own shares. The share price in the amount was been driven rather than to build new aircraft from the money, says Hamilton. When the broad guidelines of the today’s 787 were developed shortly after the takeover, Condit and Stonecipher insisting on it, to limit the financial risk for Boeing with risk partnerships. It was the genesis for all this outsourcing.
The physicist Hans Weber, who lives in California and is a more intimate connoisseur of the authorisation procedure for new aircraft, has advised Boeing and Airbus for many years. Today, he recalled that also Airbus had followed a similar path with the construction of the A380. But Boeing have simply want to cut costs at all costs. “The former manager of the McDonnell-Douglas had never a new aircraft design agreed, if a particular limit had been exceeded. The supplier should take over a part of the development. At the end of the risk-sharing in this programme was big like never before“, says Hans Weber. As should be apparent later the risk of a delay, this had still raised.
Two-thirds of the production were temporarily under foreign control. The outsourcing of work packages was thus not new, but the kind of cooperation. The predecessor of Spired, the 777, which took off the mid-1990s for the first time, large parts of the production were already outsourced. This time, but Boeing were also whole sections of the development of the hand. Shanahan describes it in review as: “Division of labour was the core of the business model for the Dreamliner. We delegated work to our partners and grant them without permanently to monitor the progress.”
The wings come from Mitsubishi from Japan, the fuselage of the Italian Alenia, the chassis provides Messier-Bugatti-Dowty from Great Britain, and by Latécoère in France, the doors are. Even the great rival Airbus helping to build. The daughter of premium Aerotec delivers the so-called pressure bulkhead that closes the rear of the passenger area.
This shift of the production risks wanted to pay Boeing on success with billions of dollars. And the seemed so close, sold the 787 but initially shiny. At the first presentation 2007 634 units were appointed (today there are 821) – to the list price of $160 million. Hardly an airline wanted to waive the Dreamliner. Fuel savings of up to 20 percent and new opportunities for nonstop operation helped to see some risks.
As if it were not difficult enough to coordinate the work of hundreds of suppliers, management with the Dreamliner designed the first aircraft consisting of half plastic too well. With completely different properties than the usual aluminium hulls.
Until the plane was too heavy to actually realize the promised savings, then rivets for joining of components were missing Boeing, and engineers in Seattle filed a lawsuit in December 2010 of rain on the plane, caused by condensing steam. An industry experts reported that the scope of the software, a measure of the complexity of the aircraft systems, multiplied. By 17 million lines of code, twice as many as the A380, fought the Spired engineers. The result: The first delivery had to be moved eight times. In some cases, the competent Manager flew after all.
Another problem for the engineers in Seattle was the fact that the Boeing headquarters was moved from Seattle to Chicago. To show all employees that is Boeing not only for aircraft construction, the group moved on 4 September 2001 in the Interior. More than half of the $64 billion turnover generated the company 2010 aerospace and defense operations.